The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking by Ibrahim, Hudda
The Journal of Social Encounters 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 5 
2018 
The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking 
Hudda Ibrahim 
St. Cloud Technical and Community College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters 
 Part of the African Languages and Societies Commons, African Studies Commons, Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ibrahim, Hudda (2018) "The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking," The Journal of Social 
Encounters: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, 60-68. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters/vol2/iss1/5 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in The Journal of Social Encounters by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@csbsju.edu. 
The Journal of Social Encounters 
60 
 
The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking 
 
Hudda Ibrahim 
St. Cloud Technical and Community College 
 
In this paper I explore the mediation and reconciliation efforts of traditional Somali elders. I also 
discuss why traditional elders have been effective peacemakers in Northern Somali (Somaliland) 
but not in Somalia. I argue that four factors comprising an “insider-partial mediation” approach 
in Somaliand helps to explain why it was effective there.  In conclusion, this paper shows that the 
traditional Somali approach of peacemaking is a viable and effective approach to mitigating 
conflicts in Somalia. 
 
Somalia is located in the horn of Africa and shares a border with Kenya to the south, Ethiopia to 
the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden in the north, and the Indian Ocean in the east. 
Nearly all Somalis are Sunni Muslim (Elmi, 2010). Somalia has a population of around 10 million 
people. About 85 percent of its residents are ethnic Somalis who have historically settled the 
northern and central parts of the country.  
 
Somalia has been characterized as one of the most ethnically, linguistically, religiously and 
culturally homogenous countries in Africa (Lewis and Samatar, 1999). In Somalia, there are six 
major clan-families. Four of these are predominantly pastoral clans and they are known as Samaal– 
the Dir, Darod, Isaaq and Hawiye - representing about 70 percent of Somalia's population, while 
the remaining two (the Digil and Rahanwayn) are Sab, engage in agriculture and constitute about 
20 percent of the population (Metz,1992). Somali clans live in Somalia, Djibouti, northeastern 
regions of Kenya and the southeastern part of the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia.    
 
Despite the fact that Somalia is ethnically homogenous, the society is deeply divided into rival 
clans. Clan membership serves as both protection and insurance for clan members and it centers 
around the struggle for recognition in social, political, economic and cultural rights and status 
(Metz, 1992). For thousands of years, Somali society followed a kinship system in which people 
trace their ancestors through the male line (Walls, & Kibble, 2010). Regarding kinship/clans 
Michael Walls (2009, p. 38) noted that, "Kinship determines social structures." This is true in 
general for pre-state societies: kinship is the predominant form of social organization. In the 
Somali context, people live in kinship/clan localities and each locality has its separate community 
or village elders. Each clan structure is divided into sub-clans and sub-sub-clans, which do not 
always get along with each other in spite of the fact that they are part of the same clan.  Clans are 
not necessarily equal in terms of the number of their members (Elmi, 2010). Each clan has a 
community or traditional clan elder whose main job is to work as an intermediary and a 
peacemaker in his clan and with other clans. 
 
The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking: South vs. North 
When evaluating the reasons why peacemaking was successful in Somaliland but unsuccessful in 
Somalia, it is important to consider the differences in the region and the strategies used. Even 
though Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991, some regions have 
achieved a sustained peace, while others remain in conflict. Somaliland and Somalia took different 
courses; while Somaliland brought peace among clans living in the North and promoted power 




sharing, the armed factions in southern Somalia further fragmented into many conflicting groups. 
Currently, Somaliland is an autonomous region that seceded from southern Somalia in 1992 to 
form its own administration; however, the international community does not recognize Somaliland 
as a country.    
 
Despite the fact that Somalia has a notorious history of anarchy for over two decades, the conflicts 
during this era have provided some useful lessons about traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Somaliland and Somalia share some similarities. Between 1988 and 1991, armed rebels from the 
North and the South clashed with the government army. After the armed groups removed President 
S. Barre from power in 1991, intra-clan conflict emerged. However, the traditional elders from 
Northern Somalia pacified their territories while the hostilities in the South have undermined the 
elders’ capacity to mediate between their communities.   
 
Somaliland's model of peace and reconciliation may be successfully implemented in Somalia if 
traditional elders are empowered. A robust traditional council of elders with credibility and moral 
authority can play a crucial role in bringing a sustained peace process to Somalia. In the North, the 
traditional elders held numerous reconciliation conferences inside of the country and almost all 
produced peace. By contrast, Southern Somalia responded to the conflict by holding a number of 
conferences outside of Somalia, but none of these yielded tangible results. 
 
Traditional Elders as Insider-Partial Mediators 
Recent research in mediation literature has focused on how and when outside third-party mediators 
intervene. An outsider mediator's neutrality is considered central to the concept of mediation 
among many Western theorists. However, I argue that insider-partial mediators, not neutral 
outsiders, play a crucial role in the conflict setting in Somalia. Unlike external third-party 
mediators who are actors coming from outside of the conflict setting, the insider-partial mediators 
are a part of the community (see Ledrach, 1997). Svensson and Lindren (2013) argue that insider-
partial mediators have an issue of bias. I disagree because the insider-partial mediators are rooted 
within the community, trusted, and are likely to stay in the mediation process until conflict stops. 
In the case of Somalia, I argue that the insider- partial mediator's bias does not necessarily mean 
they ally with one side over the other, but that they strive to prevent conflict, bring parties in 
conflict together and build trust and relationship. More importantly, insider-partial mediators may 
have a stake in ending the conflict and winning the hearts and minds of the conflicting parties. 
Therefore, these mediators do not only enjoy trust from the communities, but they also have moral 
authority, and therefore are effective intermediaries. In Somalia, traditional elders play a role in 
resolving all types of conflicts. The elders are responsible for governing the clan, and making the 
decisions for the clan on a range of issues. During clan arbitration, they act as judges in criminal 
offenses such as murder and theft. After they hear the evidence the parties presented, they decide 
who was guilty and then make a decision on "punishment" or compensation that they impose on 
the parties. In the North, if there is a criminal offense involving two separate clans, a combined 
council of elders from the two clans deals with the offense. If there is a criminal offense within 
one sub-clan or sub-sub-clan, elders negotiate with one another, act as judges and decide who 
guilty is and what the punishment is. Elders can resolve offenses within one clan quicker than 
offenses between two clans. When two clans fight, elders from a third-party clan in the same region 
initiate intervention in the conflict. During their mediation process, those third party mediators act 
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as facilitators. In this type of mediation, the elders do not make decisions and impose them on the 
parties like judges, but help the parties to reach a decision.  
  
In some conflict settings, the roles of elders may vary. Some elders work together and form a 
council of elders who ensure that conflict will be prevented in time.  When a conflict between sub-
clan members is low in intensity, individual elders may resolve the conflict. In this case, one elder 
does the mediation. Sometimes a council of elders mediates between the communities in conflict.  
If the conflict is intense, intervention of a council of elders is essential.  
 
As indicated above, Somali clan elders are not only confined to the mediation process, but also 
they function as arbitrators. An ad hoc council of elders may listen to the parties in conflict and 
then make a decision that they impose on the parties. Traditional elders' roles depend on Somali 
societal structure. Lewis (1981) divides the structure into three core elements: 1) clan structure, 2) 
customary law (xeer) and 3) clan elders' traditional authority.  Clan members who live in a 
particular village have traditional clan elders who manage the affairs of the clan through traditional 
or customary laws..  
 
In Somalia, modern professional credentials in peacebuilding are not the key criteria by which 
elders are chosen. The key standards to select clan elders include age, knowledge of religion and 
of the local customary laws, patience and the power of oratory (Bradbury and Healy, 2010; Lewis, 
1961).  As Lewis notes, respect is attached to age and seniority in the clan. In Somali culture, age 
and respect are two traits that are intertwined. I argue here, however, that age does not always 
matter. The concept of respect plays a fundamental role in the perceived capacity to mediate 
conflict. 
 
A clan elder's rise to a position of influence, according to Menkhaus (2000), is based not on 
hereditary status, but on a lifetime reputation as being an effective negotiator, a trusted mediator, 
an orator, or a wise and pious man. Most scholars agree that traditional elders are required to be 
orators. In a society with constant conflicts and reconciliation meetings, clan elders are likely to 
shuttle between warring groups both in urban and rural areas. In this type of reconciliation process, 
traditional elders must have good communication skills and the capacity to engage people outside 
of their own clan. In Somali society, someone who is fair and knowledgeable about religious 
practices, customs and customary laws is a preferable candidate for peacemaker (Bradbury and 
Healy, 2010), The elder should know Sharia law and Islamic religious principles. In most villages, 
traditional leadership is buttressed by religious conviction. Haroon and Mare (2005) also note that 
a clan elder is well respected in his clan and community, perceived as being fair and honest, is a 
good decision-maker, and is knowledgeable of customary law or xeer. A council of clan elders is 
the highest governing body of the society (Renders, 2012).  In most regions, therefore the 
traditional elders are clan representatives who function as arbitrators and peacemakers in their 
clans or in other clans. Even though most clans call their traditional elders different names, their 
key responsibilities within the society are essentially the same. The traditional leaders feel it is 
their task to eliminate feuds, animosity, and distrust between communities.   
 
The Effectiveness of Traditional Elders in Peacebuilding 
In the absence of a central state, traditional elders play a crucial role in creating a culture of peace 
and building relationships and trust between clans in conflict. If one looks at the activities of clan 




elders in mediation and reconciliation efforts, it is evident that their effectiveness can be attributed 
to the following four factors that can be considered as components of an “insider-partial” approach:  
Clan elders (a) live in the conflict setting; (b) enjoy trust and respect; (c) wield moral and 
traditional authority and moral persuasion; and (d) have a relationship with the community.  
a)Live  in the Conflict Setting. Traditional elders live within the community that the conflict affects. 
In most localities, they are closely tied to the parties through kinship. For them, resolving conflict 
is their priority and the traditional elders seek no profit in return for their services because they 
work for the benefit and welfare of their people (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). 
b)Trust and Respect.  In mediation, trust is an essential factor in the successful outcome of the 
process. It is important to define the essence of trust and how it is built it. Trust is to have 
confidence or faith in someone. Trust often derives from the elders’ mortal authority, their 
seniority, their effectiveness in mediation and their altruistic readiness and commitment to 
resolving disputes as they arise. The community accords the elders trust because they represent 
them. Effective elders need to have the trust of their communities. In Somaliland, much empirical 
evidence demonstrates that trust between mediators and parties in conflict can be a key element of 
the mediation process.   
 
c)Moral Authority and Moral Persuasion. Elders possess moral authority.  Even though the root 
of the moral authority of elders varies, traditional clan authority is derived from seniority.  The 
moral authority of elders does not only stem from age but also comes from the community's 
perception. In addition to seniority, early conflict intervention confers upon elders a moral 
authority. The elders' moral authority also emanates from their knowledge of Shari'a and religion. 
In the traditional Somali background, religion is the most central aspect of life.  
 
Mediation and reconciliation efforts are successful and attainable when the locals have a voice and 
trust in the process. An example of locals having such voice is the informal assembly known as a 
shir in which a group of traditional elders gather together for a common purpose. The traditional 
assembly is democratic, and an open and consultative processes held when resolving particular 
crisis (Menkhaus, 2010). The traditional assembly is not exclusive and is open to any of the public 
who wish to attend or to observe.  
 
The shir process is somewhat similar to what is known as Peacemaking Circles (Pranis, 2005). 
The assemblies sit in a circle and have no fixed schedules.  This type of assembly sometimes lasts 
weeks or months. When the two sides in conflict disagree, a council of elders usee their moral 
authority to instruct the delegates to continue their deliberations until a peace deal is reached. 
Lederach and Ledrach (2010) explain the importance of  time in Somali forums: “The answer to 
the problem is more talk. One round of talks would not be enough.” Somali conflict resolution is 
based on talking about the root causes of the conflict issues before an agreement is reached. This 
type of forum demonstrates the need for patience and long-term commitment. 
 
The success or failure of a mediation effort often relies on the public perception of the actors who 
are engaging in the process. This is the reason why the elders' mediation efforts prove successful 
compared to those of external mediators. In most conflict settings, traditional elders have moral 
authority and are trusted.    
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Somali traditional elders do not have military power, so they utilize persuasion techniques and 
strategies (Elmi, 2015).  Somali traditional elders possess considerable moral persuasion when 
they want to persuade clan members to accept a peace deal, come to the discussion table, or return 
looted property back to the rightful owner.  If conflict between members of one clan or two sub-
clans flares, elders from other clans in the conflict setting act as  mediators. Elders’ quick 
intervention gives them a status. In the Somali conflict setting, moral persuasion is also  key for 
resolving a stalemate.  In 1991, traditional elders disarmed a large number of clan militiamen. 
More importantly, the elders opened up centers for rehabilitation programs that focused on 
demobilization. 
 
Ulloso (2015), a former minister and governor of the Central Bank of Somalia, attributes elders’ 
moral persuasion to their unity. He noted that there was a consensus among traditional elders in 
the North to unite and form a common position, whereas elders in southern Somalia had no unity.  
For Ulloso, elders in the North awakened, influenced and dominated all clans and rebel 
movements. In the earlier crisis in the South, the warlords weakened the elders’ power.  
d)Relationship with the Community. As indicated in the previous discussion of “insider-partial” 
mediation, a major reason why traditional elders are effective is that they have a relationship with 
parties in conflict. Such relationships allow elders to communicate with the parties and collect the 
information they need to help the parties craft a settlement. Ulloso (2015) attributes elders' 
credibility to their repetition of the mediation process. One of the reasons elders repeat their 
mediation roles is that they live side by side with the parties in conflict and have a relationship 
with them (Ulloso, 2015). The elders' commitment to bringing a viable solution to the problem 
promotes their credibility among the communities.  
 
Customary Law (Xeer), Compensation (Diya) and Forgiveness (Xalay Dhalay)  
In order to more fully understand elder’s peacemaking work, we need to explore the roles of 
a)customary law, b)compensation, and c)forgiveness in Somali society.  
.a)Customary Law (Xeer). Somali customary law (xeer) comprises a set of unwritten conventions, 
the legal framework and procedures that regulate the reciprocal behavior within and between 
Somali clan communities (Metz, 1992). 
 
According to Elmi (2010), Somali customary law is not a written constitution, and it is practiced 
as a convention; most elders are still familiar with it. It is more than a contract and it shapes the 
basic values, laws and rules of social behavior (Bradbury and Healy 2010). In Somalia, customary 
law and practice is passed down orally through generations. Traditionally, the laws define 
reciprocal rights and obligations among kin/clans, covering domestic matters, social welfare, 
political relations, property rights and the management of natural resources (Bradbury, 2008).  
 
The Somali legal system employs a mix of Islamic Sharia and customary law (Walls, 2009; 
Menkaus, 2000). Traditional elders are the custodians of the customary values of the clan. The 
elders must be conversant with the customary law that regulates traditional governance. In villages, 
customary laws are applied in solving up to 80 or 90 percent of all disputes and criminal cases 
(Gundel, 2006).  
 
b)Compensation (Diya). In Somalia, the word Diya means compensation paid to the family of 
a murdered person.  (In some regions, the term, Mag is used interchangeably.) Diya is an 




Arabic term meaning “blood compensation.” The principle of Diya is derived from the Islamic 
principles of Sharia law. In accordance with Sharia, depending on the situation, the family of 
the deceased is entitled to receive a certain number of  camels (or the monetary equivalent) 
from the family of the offender.  The victim's family may choose to excuse the perpetrator 
from the death penalty in exchange for such compensation.  If the offender's family fails to 
agree on the payment of restitution on time, conflict erupts. The family members of the 
deceased may seek revenge. Therefore, unresolved grievances create a vicious spiral of 
violence.  For instance, clan loyalty is entrenched in rural and urban custom. If a member of 
Clan A is killed, other members of Clan A are obliged to avenge the death. This could take 
the form of killing  the person from Clan B who murdered the family member or, more 
commonly, working out a blood price— a financial repayment— from Clan B to Clan A.  
Elders help to mediate Diya between the families and clans.  
 
c)Forgiveness (Xalay Dhalay). During the 22 years of S. Barre's dictatorial regime, the 
government forces committed massive atrocities against the Isaaq clan in the North.  Some 
Darod clans in the North formed militia and fought against the Isaaq. After the fall of the 
central government, Somalia and Somaliland took two different courses. In Somalia, the main 
armed movement, the United Somali Congress (USC), continued its attack on the defeated 
Darod clans, but in Somaliland, an ad hoc council of elders was desperately encouraging 
healing and reconciling. The Somaliland elders' hope relied on traditional conflict 
management based on forgiveness and amnesty. The questions are, how do elders manage 
conflict when most of the clans have unsettled grievances? What are the types of grievances? 
The process of forgiveness was not easy for elders as they faced numerous challenges in 
managing conflicts. 
 
Even though there was no formal or informal mechanism in place to handle the cases of 
longstanding and widespread grievances, elders in Somaliland used a principle based on 
blanket forgiveness known as "xalay dhalay." Literally, this term means, "he was born 
yesterday." The principle of xalay dhalay is a form of forgiveness used when costs and 
reparations are deemed incalculable (Sandstorm, 2013).  Because the conflicts in Somaliland 
lasted for a decade, the elders had no time or resources to look into all of the cases of 
grievances. In order for communities to transcend clan feuds, the council of elders chose the 
principle of forgiveness to allow feuding clan groups to forgive each other and move beyond 
their past grievances (Sandstorm, 2013).  Therefore, blanket amnesty and forgiveness were 
seen as the only viable solution to the grievances among rival clans in Somaliland. For the 
traditional elders, holding people accountable and punishing them for wrong deeds they 
committed in the past might prolong conflict. 
 
Elders consider forgiveness to be the core of the Islamic message that is rooted in Sharia. During 
clan and sub-clan meetings, elders pardoned militias of any accountability or responsibility for 
their past behavior. This principle of xalay dhalay was exclusively applied to the clans in 
Somaliland. The principle of xalay dhalay was very important in the reconciliation conferences 
held in the North. Its key aim was to settle long, protracted grievances among those clans.  





In this paper, I have examined the roles of traditional elders in mediation and reconciliation efforts. 
I focused on the elders' effectiveness. I underscored that Somaliland represented the distinctive 
case of a democratic nation born of efforts by the local traditional authorities. The model that the 
traditional Somali elders have been using for centuries is what theorists call “insider-partial 
mediation,” but future studies about whether or not such a model could be applied more widely in 
Somalia is required. I highlighted the main factors for the elders' effectiveness. In Somaliland, 
traditional elders have a relationship with the clans in the conflict settings, enjoy trust and respect, 
exercise enormous moral and traditional authority or moral persuasion, and have a strong 
relationship with the community. Those factors help them to stop conflicts and create homegrown 
mechanisms to promote peacebuilding.  
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